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Abstract : Sustainable development theorists frequently stress various ways by which 
market economies could be reformed in order to preserve the natural environment. 
Regulatory interventionism or ethical activism are frequently stressed a normative way in 
order to fulfil such an institutional task. European industrial history, however, suggests 
that the creation of valuable by-products from polluting industrial waste and emissions 
was “business as usual”, resting on economic behaviors brought about a free market 
economy. This case suggests that market incentives might have been more compatible 
with "environmental responsibility" than is usually believed. 
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Since the publication of the Brundtland Report in 1987 (Our common future, United 
Nations), sustainable development (henceforth, SD) has become a top priority in the 
public policy agenda of most developed countries as well as a relentless issue in the 
public debate and academic literature, foremost in economics and management sciences. 
 
Among the various concerns raised by the SD literature, the question of the institutional 
means enabling market economies –i.e companies- to take a better care of their natural 
environment is high on the list of issues. Indeed, numerous papers contend that pollution 
prevention measures systematically increase production costs, thereby inducing corporate 
managers to invest as little as possible effort in that respect. Once widely assumed that 
“business as usual” –and thereby “unregulated” market economies- spontaneously tend to 
be ecology-unfriendly, concepts and devices aiming at correcting this alleged market 
failure unfold. In the last decades, in addition to growing advocacy for taxation and 
regulation, « business ethics», « Corporate Social Responsibility » (henceforth, CSR), 
« best practices of governance» and « stakeholder theory » have all flourished as 
scientific concepts aiming at making business greener than it is by its own constitution. 
 
However, do companies really need to be equipped with such a conceptual prosthesis, 
either regulatory or ethical in order to curb their alleged proclivity to wreck the natural 
environment ? One approach to addressing this question is to look at the impact of market 
incentives on industrial behavior in societies characterised by generally free-market 
policies, but where governmental regulations and general interest in protecting the 
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environment are significantly weaker than in currently developed economies. Focusing 
on the case of waste recycling in industries operating in nineteenth century‟s Western 
economies, this essay will challenge the mainstream view assuming that market-oriented 
activities are spontaneously harmful to their environment unless disciplined by extra-
economic devices. Therefore, in the following, we will assume (1) waste recycling to be a 
case of sustainable economic practice and (2) European nineteenth century to be an 
archetypical age of laissez faire policies, especially in Victorian England (see Paul 1980). 
Although our line of argument is supportive rather than conclusive –mostly based on case 
study bibliographic materials- it brings about insights challenging the mainstream 
premises of SD theories. 
 
This paper is structured as follows : the first section will briefly delineate the main 
arguments put forward by sustainable development and environmental economics in 
order to support that free markets lead on externalizing costs of waste disposal unless 
politically (or ethically) oriented another way. The second section will challenge such a 
belief by introducing the main insights drawn from writings dedicated to the waste 
recycling/by products development in the industry of the 19
th
 century ; we will see that 
numerous authors emphasized that waste reuse was business as usual by that time, 
somehow anticipating by almost a century and a half some of the most hotly contested 
debates and concepts in the current literature on SD. The third section will deal with 
motives and institutions which arguably triggered the propensity of nineteenth century 
entrepreneurs to take the best advantage from their residuals ; some counterintuitive 
avenues of research will finally be sketched in line with such insights.  
 
1. The commonplace premise : markets must be “civilized” by ethics and politics. 
 
« There will be no sustainable economic development as long as it is not embedded in a 
superordinate societal context – and it is a cultural and political task to ensure this 
embedding » (Ulrich, 2010 : 100). Whilst one can never derive a “hard” general 
statement from a single quotation, the latter looks to be representative of a widespread 
belief regarding the way SD and markets do interplay. The “cultural” task invoked by this 
quotation echoes the normative ambition of much SD, CSR and stakeholder theory 
literature (see Donaldson and Preston, 1995) while the call for “political task” likely 
pertains to taxation and regulation. 
 
In order to be comprehensive, the way that SD literature envisions the degree of harmony 
between “natural environment” and “markets” would call for a specific “exegetic” 
research. There is certainly not “one view” about that issue and it would be dishonest to 
deny the controversies it brings about. For instance, Vanberg (2007) identifies three 
versions of CSR-demands: (i) “soft” (concerned with how socially responsible 
corporations ought to play the market game within existing rules); (ii) “hard” (concerned 
with how the rules of the market ought to be changed in order to induce “socially 
responsible” corporate behavior; and (iii) “radical” (which rejects the compatibility of 
CSR and market incentives and calls for the adoption of some alternative economic 
regime). Common to all three, however, is a lack of faith in the capacity of free markets 
to generate wealth equitably and sustainably. 
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Moving from CSR/SD literature to environmental economics does usually not change the 
overall picture. Although environmental economics is grounded in neoclassical welfare 
economics, looking less subject to ideological prejudices than SD literature may 
sometimes be, it usually contends that the search for increased profitability results in 
unmanageable pollution problems, the depletion of nonrenewable resources, habitat and 
species destruction, and a regulatory “race to the bottom” among competing jurisdictions 
(Hay et al., 2005). In the same vein, the leading environmental economist Robert Stavins 
argues that “if the market is left to itself, too many pollution-generating products get 
produced” (2004 : 12), a point summed up in the following way by economists Marie-
Francois Calmette and Isabelle Péchoux : “it is well known that polluting agents need to 
be induced to internalize the social cost of pollution damage, otherwise they will engage 
in excessive levels of emission of pollutants” (2006: 184). Management professors 
Roland Geyer and Tim Jackson further argue that traditional supply chains are based “on 
a linear production paradigm which relies on constant input of virgin natural resources 
and unlimited environmental capacity for assimilation of wastes and emissions” ; in their 
opinion, “there is general agreement that this is causing environmental costs on a large 
scale and of a systematic nature, which cannot be fully addressed by traditional supply 
chain management » (2004 : 56). 
 
Such views are readily turned into assumptions made about the propensity of “business as 
usual” to externalize costs related to their waste‟s disposal : for instance, Jaffe et al. 
suggest that innovations such as cleaner production methods, new pollution control 
equipment or new substitutes for environmentally harmful products alter the “terms of the 
tradeoff between the marginal cost of pollution control and its marginal social benefit”. 
When this is the case, a “specified level of environmental cleanup can be achieved at a 
lower total cost to society” while “a lower total level of pollution can be attained more 
efficiently” (2005 : 166). While Turner acknowledges the existence of opportunities for 
firms to develop innovations that are both profitable and environmentally beneficial, he 
argues : “fundamental waste reduction measures will often prove to be financially 
unprofitable”  (2000 : 716). Indeed, this author stated in an earlier book that the “basic 
difference between natural and economic systems (…) is that natural systems tend to 
recycle their waste [while] economies have no such built-in tendency to recycle” (Pearce 
and Turner 1990 : 36). This latter perspective is shared by Ayres who postulates : “the 
industrial system is very wasteful of materials and recycles very little” (2004 : 427).  
 
In short, many environmental economists currently view industrial waste and its resulting 
pollution as a market failure to be handled through government intervention, rather than a 
market opportunity for polluting businesses to develop profitable technologies that have 
both financial and environmental benefits. As Fullerton and Stavins put it, many 
economists like themselves “make a living out of analyzing market failures such as 
environmental pollution in which laissez-faire policy leads not to social efficiency, but to 
inefficiency” (1998 : 433). Turner similarly concludes that “unfettered markets fail to 
allocate environmental resources efficiently” (2000 : 705). In a more detailed conceptual 
analysis where they state that a typical firm “does not have an economic incentive to 
minimize the „external‟ costs of pollution” (p. 165), Jaffe et al. (2005) write that 
“pollution creates a negative externality, and so the invisible hand allows too much of it” 
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(p. 166) and go so far as to argue that technical change relative to the environment occurs 
at the nexus of two distinct and important market failures : 
 
“Pollution represents a negative externality, and new technology generates positive 
externalities. Hence, in the absence of public policy, new technology for pollution 
reduction is, from an analytical perspective, doubly underprovided by markets. This 
suggests that the efficiency of environmental policy depends on its consequences for 
technological change, and also that there is a potential role for policy aimed directly at 
the stimulation of environmentally beneficial technological change” (Jaffe et al., 2005 : 
168). 
 
The conceptual framework of mainstream environmental (and SD) economics lies in the 
notion of “externality” (see Pigou, 1932) according to which costs of “collateral damage” 
caused by productive activities, while not being incurred by firms, are not reflected in 
market prices ; henceforth, since the latter fail to reach their optimal level, public 
intervention is required in order to help out prices to comply with their first best value. 
As we will see in part three, such a vision of “what a market is about” should not remain 
unchallenged. At this stage of the argument, one may admit that, stated in a nutshell, the 
mainstream vision of the interplay between natural environment and the market economy 
refers to the following theoretical storyboard :  
 
(i) Business spontaneously tends to externalize environmental costs. Focusing on 
wastes, the natural propensity of firms would be to dump them into rivers, the 
atmosphere or the underground at the lesser cost. 
(ii) It is not to say that market-based policies (for instance cap and trade policies) 
or incentives may not result in efficient ecological outcomes. Be it a better use 
of raw materials (see Boiral, 2005) or a green-oriented business strategy 
bringing win-win benefits (Lanoie et Tanguay, 1999), the institutions of 
capitalism may prove making economy and ecology compatible. 
(iii)But whether markets can lead on ecology-friendly behaviours depends on an 
“extra economic” impetus –“a superordinate societal context”- of a regulatory 
(see the famous “Porter hypothesis”, Porter, 19911) or an ethical nature. 
 
Interestingly, various “Victorian (and European) pioneers of corporate sustainability” 
(Desrochers, 2009a) have emphasized the propensity of industrials to “close the loop” of 
their residuals throughout the 19
th
 century without any “social responsibility” awareness 
or “command and control” regulation to figure predominantly in the process. The 
following section introduces the main statements and insights drawn from ancient books 
having paid attention to this issue. 
                                                 
1
 The Porter Hypothesis suggests that „well-designed‟ and „well-enforced‟ environmental regulations will 
encourage firms to reduce waste, increase efficiency, and utilize newer and more efficient production 
technologies. Through incentives that otherwise don‟t exist in a market economy, managers and engineers 
will be compelled to examine their operations more closely, discover inefficiencies in and eventually 
improve upon production activities. As a result, they will more than fully offset compliance costs, become 
more competitive and profitable than non-regulated rivals, and reduce their environmental impact. 
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2. “Loop closing” and “industrial symbiosis” as “business as usual” practices in 
the  19
th
 century : 
 
2-1. Recycling waste in the 19th century : a well-documented pattern 
 
Table 1 here below lists the authors and books having the most fully documented the 
propensity of 19
th
 century European (and American) industrials to create valuable by-
products from polluting industrial wastes and emissions. 
 
Table1 : authors and books having dealt with waste recycling in the 19th and early 20th centuries 
 
Author (Nationality) Title of their main work Year of publication Editor 
(number of 
pages) 
Babbage, Charles (USA) On the Economy of 
Machinery and Manufacture 
1832  
Playfair, Lyon 
(UK) 
On the Chemical Principles 
Involved in the Manufactures 
of the Exhibition as 
Indicating the Necessity of 
Industrial Instruction 
1852 Society for 
The 
Encouragement
of Arts, 
Manufactures 
and Commerce, 
London,  
 
Simmonds, Peter Lund  
(UK) 
Waste Products and 
Undeveloped Substances: A 
Synopsis of Progress Made in 
Their Economic Utilisation 
During the Last Quarter of a 
Century at Home and 
Abroad. 
1876; 1873; 1862  Hardwicke and 
Bogue ; 
491p. 
De Freycinet, Charles  
(France) 
Traité d’assainissement 
industriel, comprenant la 
description des principaux 
procédés employés dans les 
centres manufacturiers de 
l’Europe occidentale pour 
protéger la santé publique et 
l’agriculture contre les effets 
des travaux industriels 
1870 Dunod (Paris) 
Koller, Theodor  
(Germany) 
The Utilization of Waste 
Products. A Treatise on the 
Rational Utilization, 
Recovery, and Treatment of 
Waste Products of All Kinds 
1918 ; 1915 ; 1902 
(German editions :   
1921; 1902; 1880)  
Scott, 
Greenwood & 
Sons (London);  
 
D. Van 
Nostrand (New 
York) ; 338p. 
Frederick A. Talbot 
(USA) 
Millions from Waste 1920 J. B. Lippincott 
Company, 
Philadelphia 
Clemen, Rudolf  
(USA) 
By-products in the packing 
industry 
1927 University of 
Chicago Press 
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(Chicago) 
Razous, Paul  
(France) 
Les déchets et sous-produits 
industriels. Récupération, 
Utilisation. 
1937; 1921; 1905  Dunod (Paris) ; 
604p. 
Kershaw, John B. C.  
(UK) 
The Recovery and Use of 
Industrial and Other Waste 
1928  Ernest Benn 
Limited ; 212p. 
Lipsett, Charles  
(USA) 
Industrial Wastes and 
Salvage : Conservation and 
Utilization  
1963 ; 1951  Atlas 
Publishing, 
Company; 
406p. 
 
Table 1 is far from being comprehensive : in the wake of some “pioneers” such as Peter 
Lund Simmonds, many authors took an interest in the topic of waste recycling from the 
mid-19
th
 century to the early 20
th
 century so that references dedicated to this matter (and 
authors having scrutinized it) abound ; however, authors and volumes reported in table 1 
prove to have been influential and make up a substantial part of the documentation 
available ; they provide together several thousands of cases pertaining to the major 
sectors featuring the industrial revolution. Some of the most outstanding cases reported in 
this ancient literature deserve to be introduced in order to exemplify the full trend at work 
by this time :  
 
Cattle horn 
 
Cattle horn is the most striking example introduced in Charles Babbage‟s work. From 
such an unexpected raw material have been derived by-products as numerous as combs, 
toys, substitutes for glass, knife handles, tops of whips and even compounds of soap
2
. 
 
Madder plant and other residuals used by the chemical industry 
 
As a chemist, Playfair focused mostly on advances in chemical knowledge which had 
resulted in the development of “methods of utilizing products apparently worthless, or of 
endowing bodies with properties which render them of increased value to industry”. 
Among other cases, Playfait stressed that one major problem facing the chemical industry 
was the root leftovers of the madder plant from which coloring had been extracted. This 
residual matter was not valuable enough to be sold as manure and was therefore typically 
disposed of in rivers, where it caused considerable damage. In time, however, a simple 
treatment with a hot acid was devised that recovered profitably the one-third of the 
coloring matter lost in the process. Solid paraffin, fruit liquors or ink are other 
outstanding cases of outputs derived from waste utilizing documented by Playfair. 
 
Coal tar 
 
Playfair also dwelt on the case of “coal tar” –a residual from coal gasification- along with 
some other authors (see Desrochers, 2009b). Coal tar was one of the most repulsive 
                                                 
2
 Less central for our argument, Babbage also observed how advances in mechanical precision and mass 
production resulted in “a degree of economy in the consumption of the raw material which is, in some 
cases, of great importance ». (1832 : 62-63).  
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nuisances known to the manufacturers, killing all aquatic life when discharged in rivers, 
destroying the surrounding vegetation when buried and poisoning the atmosphere when 
burned ; therefore, its elimination commanded “the expenditure of enormous sums of 
money and prodigious thought” (Talbot, 1920 : 15). However, a gradual process led on 
turning it into one of the most valuable by-products ever developed, in such an extent that 
its use caused filled with wonder comments (see Desrochers, 2009b : 6). The first highly 
significant demand for coal tar followed the introduction of the wood pressure-
impregnation process in 1838 (also known as the Bethell). This „pickling‟ or „creosoting‟ 
of timber – a process through which dried timber was placed in a container, subjected to 
partial vacuum and impregnated with heavy oils from coal tar – soon thrived on a large 
scale as a result of the increasing demand for wooden sleepers by the railroad industry, of 
wooden poles by the telegraph industry and of various coastal structures which 
incorporated a significant amount of timber. Creosote generated so much productivity 
gains relating to the treatment of wood that against all odd, this coal tar by-product 
became an important British export item, especially for the burgeoning American railroad 
industry.  
 
Nevertheless, some remaining lighter fractions of tar oil did not find of outlet until 
advances in chemical industry do a raw material for the synthetic dyes industry. In time, 
advances in synthetic dye making served as a technological springboard for the creation 
of other tar-derived products ranging from explosives, medicines and perfumes, to 
flavouring materials, sweeteners, disinfectants and antitoxins, as well as tracing and 
photographic agents. 
 
Iron slag 
 
Even more unpromising than coal tar, slag from blast furnaces employed in the smelting 
of iron has long been the “nightmare” of furnace proprietors. Simmonds reports the 
enormous quantity of slag annually produced and how costly was its elimination as a 
nuisance. After many unfruitful attempts to develop it, some entrepreneurs/inventors 
achieved significant success in this respect providing it an outlet in mostly glass and 
cement industries (see Desrochers, 2009b : 11). 
 
Livestock wastes 
 
Clemen stresses various examples of outputs (food, pharmaceuticals, explosives, 
cosmetics and so on) derived from livestock wastes such as wasted blood, feet, heads and 
other non-edible animal parts. In the same vein, Simmonds observed that the stench 
resulting from the blood and offal at large pork-packing establishment “had become such 
an offense to the neighborhood, that the proprietors were threatened with a perpetual 
injunction” (1876: 39–40). The latter soon developed a method through which they dried 
the entire refuse, including the blood. The parts containing sufficient fat to make the 
operation economical were first treated in a rendering tank where the clean fat was 
converted into lard and the refuse into grease and grease oil. The scrap left in the process, 
consisting of the bones of the head and feet and considerable meat, was then thoroughly 
mixed with the blood, dried and converted into “a valuable article of commerce”. 
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Among the authors listed in table 1, one special word must be said about Peter Lund 
Simmonds. The latter was the author with perhaps the broadest outlook on by-product 
development in the second half of 19
th
 century. The first edition of his major book (Waste 
Products, see above, 1862) stresses that by-product development was a common practice 
in Victorian British industries, especially the most important ones including iron, wool, 
silk, cotton and leather. Nevertheless, his book‟s first edition is mostly dedicated to 
organic substances, the topic being “too extensive in its scope to be discussed 
successfully in detail” in his 35 chapters (Waste Products, 1862, v.) ; later editions would 
spread the coverage of the topic
3
 and Simmonds undoubtedly became one of the leading 
advocates of waste recycling in the 19
th
 century, his contributions –through publications 
and exhibits- having aroused much interest for this topic in the late 19
th
-early 20
th
 
centuries. 
 
Some highlights must be drawn from this literature : 
 
At first and not losing sight that generalisations derived from case studies are always 
problematic, all the authors reported in table 1 stress the “business as usual” side of by-
product development “since every day furnishes new instances of what has become one 
of the most striking features of modern industry –to let nothing be lost, and to re-work 
with profit and advantage the residues of former manufactures” (Simmonds, 1876 : 477) ; 
Simmonds frequently confesses his frustration not to “expand on the subject matter” by 
fear to “weary the reader with too ponderous a volume” (ibid : 477)4. Interestingly, the 
perspective recorded by Simmonds and others is shared by famous economists such as 
Karl Marx and Alfred Marshall ; in the third volume of the Capital, Marx pointed out that 
with the advance “of capitalist production the utilization of the excrements of production 
is extended” and commented that “so-called waste plays an important role in almost 
every industry” (Marx, 1909/1894, Volume III, Part I, Chapter 5, non paginated) ; Alfred 
Marshall (1920 : Book IV, Chapter XI, non paginated) made similar observations in his 
Principles of Economics. The last quotation shall accrue to the American journalist 
Frederick Talbot who stresses that relating “all the fortunes which have been amassed 
from the commercialization of what was once rejected and valueless would require a 
volume. Yet it is a story of fascinating romance and one difficult to parallel in the whole 
realm of human activity » (1920 : 17-18). According to Simmonds, Britons were the first 
to develop by-products “on an extensive scale”, their example being rapidly emulated in 
Continental Europe, USA, Australia and even South America. 
 
Second, it is sometimes stressed that most by-products developed in the 19
th
 century were 
derived from livestock wastes  (see Clapp, 1994) ; case evidences show that there are no 
economic or technological reasons to believe that non-living organisms played a lesser 
role than living organisms as raw materials having yielded by-products. Rapid progress 
of scientific and technological knowledge made possible the full use of most residuals in 
                                                 
3
 The thirteen-page index of his third edition demonstrates the breadth of coverage. Among hundreds of 
case, let us quote « albumen from fish spawn », « asparagus stems for paper », « sulphur from coal gas » 
and so on. 
4
 It must be stressed that Simmonds‟s attention paid to by-product development far exceeds the publication 
of his main volume (see Desrochers, 2009a for a review of his works). 
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iron and chemical industry, in particular.  
 
Finally, let us note that following the example of any publication, works mentioned in 
table 1 are part of a dynamic set up reinforcing the “business as usual” pattern of by-
products development. Journal articles, conferences, exhibits and other media drawn 
from this body of knowledge helped out to make it popular and to turn it into common 
knowledge (see Desrochers, 2009a). 
 
Far from being exclusively descriptive, authors having dealt with by-products 
development tried to figure out the bottom line of the pattern that their works contributed 
to record ; as we will see, they widely share conclusions more sympathetic to market-
oriented behaviors than what is usually postulated in current mainstream SD and 
environmental economics. Nevertheless and unlike a commonplace static and narrow 
(mis)conception of market-oriented behaviors, the latter are embedded in a dynamic set 
of values, beliefs and expectations helping to understand the rationale of human action. In 
this respect, it seems likely that creating “wealth from waste” was well ingrained in 
Victorian minds. For instance, in the preface to a 1928 survey of by-product development 
authored by the chemical engineer John B. C. Kershaw, a past president of the Federation 
of British Industries, Max Muspratt (1872-1934), observed that in the days of his 
childhood, “waste not, want not” was a lesson inculcated to young people. This cultural 
proclivity for parsimony somehow echoes the search for “sustainability” so widely 
praised one century later ; one should notice whereas parsimony leads on minimizing 
losses of value, it was obviously held as inherent to the market process unlike what is 
commonly stressed in the current literature (see section 1). 
 
2-2. The bottom-line of the 19th century recycling pattern : profit, property rights and 
industrial symbiosis :  
 
Interestingly, Victorian/European specialists of by-products development identified 
institutional and technological requirements at the root of the pattern they documented : 
spur of competition, property rights (and regulations pertaining to them), industrial 
symbiosis : 
 
Search for profit under competitive pressures 
 
Most writers that this work refers to emphasized the role of competitive pressures in 
triggering entrepreneurial efforts that eventually resulted in win–win outcomes (i.e the 
transformation of a loss –wastes- into a gain –by-products). For instance, Simmonds 
argued that, as competition became sharper, manufacturers had to look more closely to 
any item that might make the slightest difference between profit and loss (1876 : 205). In 
the same vein, Alexander Clemen, the leading economic expert of the US meatpacking 
industry of his era credited the fear of being overwhelmed by competitors in the same or 
other industrial sectors as the main force having spurred by-product development. 
Modern conditions, he argued, made it “almost impossible materially to cut production 
and distribution of expense for the majority of commodities”. In this context, “one of the 
most important opportunities for gaining competitive advantage, or even for enabling an 
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industry or individual business to maintain its position in this new competition”, was to 
reduce manufacturing expenses “by creating new credits for products previously 
unmarketable” (1927: vii). Quotations of this kind could here be multiplied. 
 
Unless positing that some residuals are wasteful by their inexorable nature, there is 
nothing outstanding in such a statement, which refers to a dynamic market process. For 
instance, Karl Marx observed like many other analysts that reworked wastes “reduce the 
cost of the raw material to the extent that they are saleable. For a normal loss is always 
calculated as a part of the cost of raw material, namely the quantity ordinarily wasted in 
its consumption”, waste utilizing ultimately increases “the rate of profit” (1909/1894 : 
96). Indeed, Marx viewed industrial waste recovery as “the second great branch of 
economy in the conditions of production” (1909/1894 : 95), after production efficiencies 
arising from economies of scale. 
 
It is not to say that Victorian/European denied the severity of environmental problems 
created by profit-seeking businesses in various locations. Cases of coal tar or slag 
skimmed over this paper suffice to show that the process leading on turning a waste into a 
by-product is gradual and even uncertain ; the simple fact to state that industry made 
headway in dealing with waste underlies that the starting point of such a trend was 
undoubtedly problematic. But instead of supporting that the trade-off between productive 
activities and the environment should be reconsidered a discretionary way, Simmonds 
and other authors pointed out that the race with profit led on win-win practices through 
creative problem-solving. 
 
Legal pressure of property rights and other regulations 
 
Although it has been stated that Victorian England was less prone to regulation than the 
Western countries are currently, it is obviously not to say that businesses dis not have to 
fear threats of legal action on the other hand their nuisances. Common and civil law 
provided the foundation for the resolution of disputes between industrialists and 
individuals harmed by their activities when these last were causing trespass (any entry on 
the property), nuisance (intangible invasions such as odors and noises) or violation of 
riparian rights (altering the quality or quantity of the natural flow of water beside or 
through someone‟s property). While authors like Playfair and Simmonds tended to deem 
that spontaneous market-driven incentives were more influential than external pressures, 
they did allude to the consequences of actual and potential legal actions on incentives to 
recycling. 
 
Other writers paid more attention to this issue. Kershaw observed that the treatment of 
industrial wastes was often dictated by the necessity of “converting into an innocuous 
form some waste material, either solid, liquid, or gaseous, which, in its untreated state, is 
objectionable to the eyes or nose, or is detrimental to the health of the community” (1928 
: 2). A few decades earlier, Freycinet‟s work reached similar conclusions. In sum and 
somewhat surprisingly in light of current theoretical debates, a number of writers at the 
time observed that private property rights and environmental regulations sometimes 
triggered creative thoughts among manufacturers which, in turn, eventually resulted in 
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the creation of profitable by-products from industrial residuals (see Desrochers, 2008). In 
doing so, they anticipated by more than a century the so-called „Porter hypothesis‟, 
according to which well-designed regulations can stimulate innovations that, by 
enhancing productivity and reducing waste, increase private and social benefits (Porter 
1991).  
 
Industrial and technological conditions 
 
While competitive pressures and, to a lesser extent, the need to internalize externalities 
played the key roles in the widespread development of by-products, this process was 
further facilitated by some characteristics inherent to most industrial residuals. First, their 
value was often initially low or nonexistent, while their disposal costs were sometimes 
significant. Secondly, unlike domestic waste, industrial residuals were uniform in nature 
and typically available in large quantities. Lastly, they were often produced in 
industrialized regions, thus reducing transportation costs. In this context, several 
manufacturers and their chemists followed a few logical steps described as follows by the 
French engineer Paul Razous (1905). Residuals were first thoroughly analyzed and 
broken into their basic components. If any of these had significant value, it was isolated. 
If this was not the case, the composition of the residual was compared with the 
components of similar products such as fuels, fertilizers, animal food or building 
materials. Two scenarios were then possible. If the residual components were similar to 
those of a given commercial input, the residual could probably be used for the same 
purpose. If one or a few components were missing, it was often possible to add whatever 
was necessary to turn the residual into a suitable substitute. 
 
It is not to say that efforts dedicated to recycling were always proving fruitful as authors 
such as Koller and Kershaw point it out. But the risk attached to this long-odd/high-
payoff strategy could be run whenever residuals were available in large quantities and 
industry organized in order to foster “loop-closing” processes5 ; discussions regarding 
industrial conditions favorable for waste recycling do surprisingly anticipate issues raised 
by transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1985) some authors emphasizing that 
possibilities for effectively using wastes were generally greater in large plants (Babbage) 
while others pointed out interfirm arrangements akin to “clustering” and drawing on 
“industrial symbiosis6” between various proprietors (Simmonds, Clemen7). 
 
                                                 
5
 « Loop closing » is at the core of the « industrial ecology » metaphor that interestingly and even 
surprisingly, Playfair anticipated by stating in his major essay that the “economy of the chemistry of art is 
only in imitation of what we observe in the chemistry of nature” (1852 : 165-166). In later publications, 
commenting a quotation according to which “dirt is merely matter in the wrong place”, he suggested that 
“as science advances, it sweeps up dirt from the wrong place and deposits it in the right place” (see 
Desrochers, 2009a : 718). In the current literature, „„loop closing‟‟ refers to linkages whereby the waste 
products of one line of work become the valuable input of another (Ayres and Ayres 2002). 
6
 “Industrial symbiosis is a concept used to describe geographically proximate interfirm relationships 
involving the exchange of residual materials, water, and energy” (Desrochers et Leppälä, 2010 : 338). 
7
 Clemen‟s case study of the Chicago meat packing district is potentially insightful for transaction cost 
economics. It seems that the meat packers first outsourced part of their by-product development before 
progressively taking over the process within integrated bodies (see Desrochers and Leppälä, 2010) 
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While not theoretically designed in the light of current concepts, this body of analysis 
refers to a gradual and entrepreneurial conception of the market challenging the 
normative outreach of mainstream SD and environmental economics. Viewing the market 
as a system of coordinated human actions aiming at saving (and fostering) resources 
echoes the so-called “economic Austrian theory” from which interesting insights –and 
avenues of research addressed to sustainable development- may be derived. 
 
3. A discussion : devising the market through other lens than narrow neoclassical 
ones :  
 
The arguable « spontaneous » propensity of 19th century entrepreneurs to turn their 
costly residuals into valuable by-products lead on stimulating insights challenging some 
premises of mainstream environmental economics. We shall first challenge the concept of 
“market failure” nurturing one of the major tenets of mainstream economics. We will 
then turn our attention to the interplay between “profit seeking actors” and “environment” 
such as devised by “Austrian” theory. We will finally sketch some avenues of research 
likely to reverse the widespread anti-market prejudice encountered in the SD literature. 
 
3-1. What is a “market failure” about ? 
 
Stated in a nutshell, the assumption that a “market failure” leads companies on 
externalizing environmental costs « is steeped in standard neoclassical theories of 
efficiency and Pigouvian welfare economics » (Cordato, 2004 : 3). In light of the insights 
brought about the bibliographic material introduced in section 2, it is not anecdotic to 
recall that neoclassical economics devise the market as an “instrument” of price fixing 
purportedly failing to fulfill its duty when not reaching a “perfect” general equilibrium 
bringing each commodity‟s price at its optimal level (the so-called “state of nirvana” 
coined by Demsetz, 1969). It is to say that “imperfections” such as so-called externalities, 
public goods or asymmetrical information give birth to “market failures” precluding 
markets to convey economic information in a perfect manner ; when such market failures 
occur, institutional correction is purportedly needed –for instance, regulations- which 
liability obviously accrues to public authorities. Here stems the general statement from 
according to which regulation (even ethics) are needed in order to induce companies (i.e 
their managers) to adopt eco-friendly behaviors which, in turn, may become beneficial 
with the latter (see the Porter hypothesis, op.cit.). 
 
Thus, neoclassical economics assume that full costs of productive activities should 
instantaneously be reflected in prices, without any room for gradual adjustment between 
conflicting individual concerns at stake regarding pollution. That is the reason why 
“externalized costs” are readily called “social” ; yet, “the concept of social costs, as 
typically invoked, completely disembodies and impersonalizes costs. Social costs exist 
outside of and apart from individual choosers » (Cordato, 2004 : 6). Put differently, 
« social costs » are posited « ex cathedra » by the analyst invoking them, albeit the latter 
cannot value it insofar as there is no valuation of “costs” aside from the one originating in 
the market system. In that sense and insofar as one keeps on reasoning in the framework 
of neoclassical economics, any “ex cathedra” correction of market failures should prove 
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inconsistent
8
. 
 
In a practical way, neoclassical regulations eventually aim at “repairing the tool” that the 
market is supposed to be ; in order to do so, “regulators” must approximate the value of 
social costs and make as to turn them to the sender (by means of taxes, for instance). 
Purpose of such regulations is henceforth to work towards a “first best” economic 
situation in order to enhance the efficiency of the market system. Although the 
consequences (and possible backups) of such regulations cannot be discussed in detail 
(for a critical discussion, see Desrochers, 2002), their overall design (and purpose) merits 
a comment in light of the insight brought about our historical material : regulations often 
focus on “end-of-pipe” technologies devoted to waste elimination (thus, letting no room 
for gradual reuse) ; one may identify the print of neoclassical economics in such a lawful 
design, which postulates a substantial (and static) distinction between a useful material 
and a waste (Swift, 1998). In a nutshell, “command-and-control” regulations somehow 
underpin the vision of “Mother Earth” as a stakeholder calling for immediate protection9 
instead of viewing pollution as a problem of neighborhood arousing incentives to turn not 
only the worthless but the harmful into the worthy.  
 
3-2. Designing the interplay between the market and the environment through the lens of 
Austrian Economics :  
 
According to Austrian theorists
10
, “the market is not the impersonal buying and selling of 
goods and resources by independent contractors. The market is a system of private 
ownership rights which guides and constrains the actions people take to improve their 
situation” (Matthews, 1998 : 44). For such a purely individualistic conception of the 
market, (a) costs are strictly subjective, (b) efficiency refers only to “intra- and 
interpersonal plan formulation and execution” (Cordato, 2004 : 7) and (c) the market 
aims at resolving interpersonal conflicts for scarce resources on the basis of an efficient 
system of individual property rights. It ensues that, regarding the perspective on 
pollution, the Austrian outlook « shifts (…) from one of “market failure” where the free 
market is seen as failing to generate an efficient outcome, to legal failure where the 
market process is prevented from proceeding efficiently because the necessary 
institutional framework, clearly defined and enforced property rights, is not in place » 
(Cordato, 2004 : 10). Envisioning « pollution » by the yardstick of individual property 
rights leads on dividing environmental stakes into cases when rights are defined but ill-
enforced (typically, conflicts of neighborhood) and cases when rights are simply non 
existent (“commons”). 
 
                                                 
8
 By contrast, it would not be internally inconsistent to advocate that the market economy must be 
superseded by an overall « command and control » system of regulation which would make little and even 
no stake of any reference to interpersonal utility. 
9
 See Stead and Stead (2000) as an illustration of this line of reasoning. 
10
 Carl Menger‟s seminal work (1981/1871) is considered as the starting point of what has been denoted  
“Austrian economics”. In the 20th century, most Austrian theorists refer to Ludwig Von Mises (1949) as 
being the leading figure of this school of thought (for more detail, see the web site of the Ludwig Von 
Mises Institute, http://mises.org/) 
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The prominence of the rule of law 
 
The Austrian theoretical framework is a good candidate with the comprehension of the 
spontaneous propensity of entrepreneurs to reuse their wastes, throughout the 19
th
 
century. It is indeed often believed that “laissez faire” policy is characterized by a lack of 
regulatory constraints on industrial polluters. What is forgotten, however, is that 
traditional institutions that served as vital pillars for any robust market economy included 
property rights and the rule of law. These latter factors served as a powerful means of 
protecting property owners from environmental degradation because damaging someone 
else‟s property through polluting emissions was no more acceptable than vandalizing it. 
Although common or civil law regulations may be seen as part of the overall concept of 
regulation which, according to the Porter hypothesis, is a necessary condition in order to 
spur win-win innovations, it differs from “command-and-control” current environmental 
regulations. In a nutshell, civil law (henceforth, law) refers to rules aiming at making 
coordination of individual plans easier (or even possible) while statutory law (i.e 
legislation) aims at achieving political plans (for a broad distinction between “law” and 
“legislation”, see Hayek, 1973). Yet, there is no conceivable market without any rule of 
law underlying it ; in this respect, one must not make a confusion between politically 
designed regulations targeting environmental benefits and the rule of law whose 
environmental impact is mediated by induced catallactic behaviors
11
. 
 
For example, along with statements made by Playfair and Simmonds, in countries 
operating under the British of legal tradition (i.e common law precedents), nuisance 
applications were quite comprehensive and covered, among other issues, public health 
(e.g. keeping of diseased animals), public safety (e.g. storage of explosives), public 
discomfort (e.g. dust, smoke, vibration) and public convenience (e.g. road obstruction). 
While this liability system mandated no specific conduct, remedies included 
compensation for past injuries, injunctions (an order by the court requiring the cessation 
of offensive activity or specifying corrective action), or compensation from expected 
future harm should the court allow the polluter to continue his actions. In some cases, 
remedies could also include abatement of the nuisance by self-help (Prosser 1966). 
Individuals could take legal actions against nuisances and seek either or both monetary 
damages or injunctions. According to most legal scholars, the threshold of proof was 
quite lenient as the plaintiff needed only to show that he or she had suffered physical or 
economic harms and such nuisance needed not be injurious to health. From the early 
decades of the nineteenth century onwards, however, British and American judges 
increasingly sought to balance the benefits of economic growth against the health and 
comfort of the public, and litigation based on the violation of private property rights 
slowly lost their effectiveness (Brenner, 1974). 
 
By comparison of the powerful legal infrastructure provided by the common (or civil) 
law, some authors charged statutory law to be exceedingly permissive since it tended to 
nullify the deterrent properties of private property rights (Brubaker 1995; Meiners and 
Morriss 2000). In light of such a remark and while this issue remains outside the 
boundaries of this article, one could wonder if recent regulations did not shift the 
                                                 
11
 Austrian economics readily use the word « catallactic » instead of « economic ». 
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traditional recovery focus of industry executives and workers toward regulatory 
compliance laid on the aforementioned “arbitrary distinction” between a waste and a 
useful material (Desrochers, 2002 ; Meiners et Yandle, 1999).  
 
The prominence of entrepreneurial behaviors 
 
According to the authors which the core of our argument is drawn from, whether it is 
spurred by legal constraints or more spontaneously competition-driven, entrepreneurship 
plays a crucial role in the pattern that this paper focuses on. Indeed, as scientist Jesse 
Ausubel puts it: “pollution and waste usually indicate inefficiency. In an economy of 
competing companies, inefficiency is for losers. So, over the long run, successful 
companies are going to be green and clean” (1998 : 39). 
 
This vision of the market as a dynamic system of competitive pressures bringing about 
change in the methods of production echoes the Austrian conception of entrepreneurship. 
According to one of its major theorists, once considered that information about prices is 
imperfect, profit opportunities exist which are never common knowledge ; henceforth, 
entrepreneurship may be defined as “alertness” to unnoticed price opportunities that some 
individuals will exploit by buying (selling) any commodity lower (higher) than the 
current price ; by doing so, entrepreneurs are endogenous change drivers in the market 
economy (Kirzner, 1973). 
 
Nineteenth century‟s industrials may actually be devised as “super entrepreneurs” having 
sold for considerable value materials which were nothing but a matter of cost.  However, 
one should keep in mind that such a Kirznerian arbitrage was made possible only through 
a long-odd process of research and innovation bringing about some risk bearing. 
Devising entrepreneurs as arbitragists –i.e somewhat traders- should not lead to lose sight 
that entrepreneurial operations always run on time and draw on a risky by nature 
roundabout process (for a discussion about “Austrian” entrepreneurship, see Klein, 
1999). One may mundanely see 19
th
 century‟s industrials as people having tried to benefit 
the best from economic and technological information at their disposal in order to 
improve their well-being. Since “knowledge” is the key element of the market process –
property rights making up the foundation of the market as an institution- it is not 
surprising that “loop-closing” is all the more to be implemented that it benefits from day-
to-day communications between industrials located in about the same place (see 
Desrochers and Leppälä, 2010)
12
. 
 
3-3. Conclusive reflection advocating counter-intuitive avenues of research :  
 
At this point of our argument, it may be supported that (i) market-oriented economic 
behaviors are arguably more eco-friendly than what is usually thought and (b) search for 
profit (i.e “greed”) may be sufficient to arouse conducts which indirectly benefit to the 
environment (albeit the triggering effect of statutory regulations should obviously not be 
brushed aside). 
                                                 
12
 In light of this last remark, it may be that the refocusing of many firms on their core competencies in the 
last two decades has reopened the doors to external symbiotic relationship. 
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Interestingly, while such a statement leaves room for discussion as for the Porter 
hypothesis, it does little case of any conceptual added-value recognized to ethical 
managerial behaviors such as those which are emphasized by CSR. In short, hence profit-
motive and market competition may prove being eco-friendly behavioral drivers, why 
would managers need any alternative set of values in order to run companies an “ethical” 
way (if not for serving such or such vested interest) ?  
 
The aforementioned question is stated a crude and provocative way ; discussing about 
any fruitful insight or flaw of the CSR doctrines is obviously outside the boundaries of 
this paper. Nevertheless, let us assume that most matters of fact stressed by the 
mainstream SD literature are actually relevant, namely our economic system leads on 
depressing ecosystems, depleting non renewable natural resources and in a whole, 
wrecking our natural environment. By deduction from our work, the following question 
would arise : what if 20
th
 century‟s market economies were less “profit-oriented” than 
their “ancestor” ? 
 
Two arguments could make up a starting point for such an heterodox avenue of research :  
 
Firstly, it is interesting to point out that in the wake of Berle and Means seminal work 
(1932) about separation between ownership and control in US corporations, famous 
economists endorsed that from the beginning of the 20
th
 century up to the age of 
“globalization” (approximately), power in major American companies had shifted from 
owners to professional managers (see Galbraith, 1967) this advent of managerial firms 
having possibly led “profit maximization” to be superseded by “sales maximization” in 
the range of managers‟ objectives (Baumol, 1959). It is plausible –and perfectly in line 
with our argument- that the alleged managerial omnipotence that one would infer from 
such an evolution entailed an overconsumption of resources (in particular natural) which 
is by nature wasteful (i.e harmful to the environment). Though highly conjectural, such 
an avenue of research may be supported by some overall remarks. 
 
Let us first note that is would be pointless to charge “big managerial firms” for 
“ecological inefficiency” inasmuch as many among the authors nurturing our argument 
have stressed that big size was a facilitating and arguably necessary condition for 
recycling wastes. On another end, it would likely be simplistic to set a crude historical 
distinction between the age of the market (that would be characteristic of the 19
th
 
century) and the age of the management (that would be characteristic of the 20
th
 century). 
Furthermore, albeit new institutional economics readily tends to draw a boundary 
between transactions ruled by the market and operations ran within the organization (see 
Coase, 1937), such a distinction is somehow hazy. After all, isn‟t the choice of 
commercial partners a managerial task ? Conversely, aren‟t managerial skills sold and 
bought through a market ? (see Matthews, 1998). 
 
An insightful critical reappraisal of issues at stake regarding the separation between 
ownership and control may once again stem from Austrian economics : Padilla and 
Kreptul argue that “separation of ownership and control means that owners have 
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delegated part of their control and use rights to the managers but ultimately keep the most 
important residual right to take away the delegated control and use rights from the 
managers if they are dissatisfied with how the firm is managed. On the other hand, 
managerial omnipotence is when owners have either : virtually lost their residual control 
rights ; cannot exercise their residual control right because the costs of doing so outweigh 
the benefits » (2004 : 4-5). In sum and as to make the distinction between “market” and 
“organization” relevant, firms headed by omnipotent managers and firms directed by 
managers under control of owners should not be mixed up. Yet « a familiar liability of 
investor-owned firms (…) is that investors are frequently in a poor position to discipline 
management. In the typical publicly traded US business corporation, no individual 
shareholder possesses a block of stock sufficiently large to provide a meaningful degree 
of control. This is true not only for individual shareholders, but even for groups of 
shareholders that might wish to act collectively in influencing corporate activity. (…). As 
a result, the managers of many large corporations have long been essentially self-
appointing and self-policing, free of direct accountability to their company‟s owners » 
(Hansmann, 1996 : 57). 
 
Once admitted that the Berle-Means corporation primarily results from this fragmented 
ownership, it is noteworthy to stress that the latter widely lies in the accumulation of state 
and federal legislation since the end of the 19
th
 century (Roe, 1994) having entailed  
“legal restrictions on financial institutions, insider trading regulation, antitrust regulation, 
federal and state anti-takeover restrictions, state corporate law of fiduciary duty, and 
contract and labor legislation » (Padilla and Kreptul, 2004 : 12).  
 
In sum, it is not irrelevant (although highly conjectural at this stage) to argue that 
throughout the 20
th
 century, a growing body of regulations progressively lessened the 
efficiency of ownership control on firms (in the US but also, quite a different way, in 
Europe, see Klein, 1999). Yet, keeping up with our line of argument, weakened property 
rights may have induced harmful fallouts on the environment. Such an avenue of research 
would be challenging for the core of CSR inasmuch as it runs counter some widespread 
recommendations according to which managers should balance stakeholder and 
shareholder interests in order to relieve the firm from “short-term” financial pressures. In 
contrast, our argument would call for more proprietary control (i.e less discretionary 
management) on the running or companies. 
 
Secondly and keeping on acknowledging that productive activities may actually have 
harmed “Planet Earth” an hazardous way in the 20th century, it is outstanding to notice 
that, to the best of our knowledge, works are seldom that took an interest in the ecological 
fallouts of stimulative economic policies consisting of lowered interest rates and fiscal 
deficits in order to leverage the consumption of goods (i.e resources). Although Austrian 
theorists have paid peculiar attention to boom and bust economic cycles possibly caused 
by financial and fiscal stimulus (see Cwit, 2008 for instance) little is said about its 
interplay with “sustainable development” issues. 
 
Conclusion   
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Despite widespread beliefs to the contrary among sustainable development theorists, 
much evidence suggests that competition, the price system, and legal constraints based on 
property rights and/or specific legislation enactments historically led to significant 
reduction in the amounts of waste released into the environment by various industries 
operating all along the 19
th
 century in Western Europe. 
 
Assuming that the analysis presented in this essay is by and large correct, why is it so 
much at odds with current historical analysis? One can think of a few reasons. A first is 
that, in some cases, pollution problems took years and even decades to be solved 
profitably. While they might have been considered an acceptable (perhaps mistakenly) 
price to pay in a growing economy, vivid descriptions of burning rivers or cities covered 
with smoke and soot certainly do not help convey the impression that progress was being 
made in this respect. Perhaps just as significant is the fact that doomsday visions of the 
environment have become dominant over the last four decades. This worldview might 
explain the widespread belief among academics working in disciplines ranging from 
engineering to economics that past industrial development was characterized by a linear 
process of extraction, production, use, and disposal
13
. 
 
This paper provides some evidence that industries covering a wide array of activities 
made a fruitful use of their wastes throughout the 19
th
 century, especially in Victorian 
Great Britain. It contents sufficient insights to challenge the mainstream visions of the 
interplay between ecology and economy both in the popular and academic literature. It 
also suggests that narrow-designed conceptions of the market as a mere “machinery of 
prices” do not render justice to its procedural nature. Nevertheless, the limitations of this 
work are inherent to case studies. As already stated, it is irrelevant to derive any 
generalization from a collection of documents, even numerous. Furthermore, knowing if 
we should credit profit-seeking incentives or triggering regulations with “end-of-pipe” 
ecological virtues remains opened to discussion. At last and recalling that a free market is 
not a consciously controlled device dedicated to any political end, anyone can always 
reckon that its course is detrimental (or not beneficial enough) to such or such kind of 
“social needs”.   
 
Our work does not primarily intend to challenge value-based visions of the environmental 
cause insofar as such political visions tend to blame markets for not attaining objectives 
they have never been designed for. This paper basically aims at challenging the concept 
of “market failure” at the core of “sustainable development” tenets by arguing that, 
although not perfect, the invisible hand contains qualities of parsimony and self-
regulation which may prove being, somewhat unexpectedly, eco-friendly over the long 
run.
                                                 
13
 One could even point out there is something tautologically inconsistent in stating that “industrial 
revolution damaged the natural environment” at least when recalling that no animal specie could thrive in 
such a depressed environmental context. Yet, the industrial revolution set along with a demographic 
revolution having dramatically increased the European population. 
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